

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003300110024-2

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003300110024-2

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003300110024-2

*Mar 77*

DRAFT OUTLINE OF PUBLIC STATEMENT ON SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE

I. Circumstances

The adequacy of Soviet Civil Defense must be judged against different levels of possible counter-attack by the United States ranging from attack by the full inventory of U.S. strategic weapons to attack by a modest number that might survive the first strike. For purposes of this analysis a "worst case" (a modest U.S. retaliatory capability) is assumed.

II. Parameters.

The following are four criteria for measuring the effectiveness of civil defense:

1. Ability to protect key government leaders.
2. Ability to protect the population as a whole.
3. Ability to protect our industrial capacity.
4. Ability to protect sources of food.

III. Protection of Leadership

The Intelligence Community agrees that extant Soviet Civil Defense endeavors provide adequate measures to protect their key military and civilian leadership.

IV. Protection of the Population

- A. The DCI estimate of the percentage of population in the principal urban centers subject to attack which could be sheltered and defended is \_\_\_\_\_. Because of

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003300110024-2

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003300110024-2

uncertainties in our knowledge, we believe that this estimate could be high or low by as much as \_\_\_\_%.

- B. In the Intelligence Community there are other agencies which believe that the uncertainties cause this estimate to vary upward from the extreme given above to an estimate that on the high side as much as \_\_\_\_% of the urban population could be protected.

V. Protection of Critical Industrial Capacities

- A. The DCI believes that an extremely small percentage (\_\_\_\_%) of the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union which would be required for recovery and continued waging of war after limited second strike by the United States could be adequately protected. The inadequacies of our information lead to a further estimate that this could be off by a factor of \_\_\_\_%.
- B. Other agencies of the Intelligence Community believe that uncertainties cause this estimate to vary from the extreme with a probability of error as high as \_\_\_\_%, or to an estimate that on the high side as much as \_\_\_\_% of the critical industrial capacities could be protected.

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003300110024-2

**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## VI. Protection of Food Supplies

- A. The DCI believes the Soviets now have a capability for storage and protection of grain from extremely light attack and fallout only to an amount equivalent to one percent of the annual consumption of the Soviet Union. There is considerable uncertainty in this area and the estimate could be off by as much as 500 percent. Even with an error this great it would mean that storage would not be adequate to provide more than \_\_\_\_% of annual consumption of this one foodstuff.
- B. Other agencies of the Intelligence Community believe that the uncertainties cause this estimate to vary from the extreme with a probability of error as high as \_\_\_\_, or to an estimate that on the high side as much as \_\_\_\_% of the food supplies could be protected.

## VII. Rehearsal

- A. Another critical ingredient for an effective civil defense program, besides protection infrastructure is the ability to organize the movement of people and actually exercise dispersal capabilities.
- B. The DCI sees no evidence of Soviet Civil Defense exercise activity adequate to provide them any assurance that they could achieve an acceptable level of personnel protection. The CIA estimates that it would take \_\_\_\_ years of a modest program of rehearsals to achieve such a level of capability. Other intelligence agencies agree.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003300110024-2

-4-

VIII. Investment - The Intelligence Community estimates that the Soviets are spending \_\_\_\_\_ rubles (roughly equivalent to \_\_\_\_\_ dollars) per year in construction of civil defense facilities. There is (not) evidence that this rate of investment has increased over the past five years.

A. United States investment in comparable civil defense construction amounts to \_\_\_\_\_ per year.

IX. Conclusion

It is not the conclusion of the DCI or any agency of the Intelligence Community that the Soviets today possess a civil defense capability that would enable them to feel that they could absorb even a light second strike from the United States with a reasonable expectation of survival. There are three issues, however, that deserve consideration:

1. Rate of improvement expected in the future:

The DCI estimates that if the rate of investment in the past five years continues the above conclusion will not be seriously changed. There are other agencies of the Intelligence Community who feel that the rate of investment is likely to increase to a level that will give the Soviets a reasonable probability of expecting that they could absorb a second strike from the United States within acceptable limits by 198\_\_.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003300110024-2

-5-

2. The fact that the Soviet Union is currently making a far more substantial investment in civil defense than the United States must be considered. The least it indicates is that Soviet leaders feel that they must make some preparation for the possibility of strategic nuclear warfare. This does not necessarily mean that they are planning to initiate such warfare; it does mean that they apparently are thinking through the consequences of there being at least some exchange of nuclear weapons and planning for a post-attack recovery. This is in contrast with general attitudes in the western world where the emphasis is almost exclusively on the deterrence of nuclear warfare.
3. We must also consider that the present levels of civil defense protection in the Soviet Union are much more impressive when balanced against the maximum capability of the Chinese People's Republic to launch a first strike.

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003300110024-2

Next 16 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003300110024-2

NFIB ISSUES

A. OPPORTUNITY THAT PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT PROVIDES.

- o ALONG WITH CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST.

B. EMPLOY -

1. REBUILD DESERVED PUBLIC CONFIDENCE

2. ADJUST COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIPS FOR GREATER EFFECTIVENESS

- o ESPECIALLY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT EVOLUTION OF THE ART -

- COVERT IS DOWN

- oo LEGALITY IS UP

- TACTICAL/NATIONAL MERGING

- SIGINT/OVERHEAD CONTINUE TO GROW

- o YOU ARE THE ONES KNOW WHAT NEEDS AND CAN BE DONE

- PRM-11 VEHICLE

- oo WANT DISCUSS W/O PRE-EMPTING STUDY

3. TIGHTEN SECURITY

- o REBUILD MORALE - SENSE DEDICATION

4. DEFINE REQUIREMENTS -

- o PRESIDENTIAL PARTICIPATION -

- DCI INITIATIVE - STAFFING

- oo MEETING PRINCIPALS

C. WANT IDEAS

- o SOLICIT THEM

- o INTERIM THINKING 5 AREAS

- 4 FROM PRESENTATION

- BUDGET

- o TERMINOLOGY?



Describe in detail for presentation to the President those areas of least certainty in our intelligence which have the greatest importance. What areas do we need to know the most about that we have the biggest gaps in information?

What are the most important things we know from our secure means and sources that are not in open literature? For example, the military balance book published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies is unclassified. Is this good enough? What supplement does our Intelligence Community provide to this unclassified information which makes a significant difference in our perception of foreign military capability?

What long-term topics should be prepared for presentation to the President by the Intelligence Community? Not topics of internal organization or problems, but products of the analytical team are topics which a man who has not been exposed to classified information should know. What things should we be bringing to President Carter to educate him?

I would like to appoint a task group to make a survey and tell me how we can expand the distribution of our product; to businesses, to Congressional Committees on all subject areas, to business communities, to decision-makers who are going abroad, a whole host of possible outlets for our product to serve the government and

-2-

the people better, and gain a recognition for our hard-working intelligence people and provide us with a broader base for objective analysis.

-Need to have ideas on resolving the problem of leaks. How do we tighten up access to sensitive sources and methods. What sanctions should we impose.

-How do we provide better political analysis to the President.

-How do we reorganize for PRM-11. I see no Blitz, however, my charter is clear.